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INTRODUCTION 
As rates of urbanization continue to rise in cities around the world, 
there is a marked convergence in both the opportunities and 
challenges for cities accompanying this trend.  Much as economic 
globalization has made cities into central players in the world 
economy,1 so too has urbanization rendered cities key sites for the 
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 1. See SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 333–34 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 2001) (noting that “global cities” such as London, 
Tokyo, and New York have emerged from the concentration of finance industries 
that in turn impact each city’s urban forms as well as its workers and population-at-
large in a way that reorganizes prior capital-labor relations); John Friedmann, The 
World City Hypothesis, 17 DEV. & CHANGE 69 (1986) (arguing that the new 
international division of labor is organized through a class of cities designated as 
“world cities”). 
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advancement of social and economic development policy.2  
Sustainable development and adaptation to climate change, among 
other challenges, necessitate that cities and metropolitan regions 
invent nimble approaches to a variety of local policies and practices, 
such as land-use planning and zoning, housing, transportation, and 
service delivery arrangements.  As such, policymakers and scholars in 
every part of the world have begun to look abroad for new ideas and 
models to govern their cities as they grapple with changing fiscal 
realities and increasing rates of urbanization. 
As urban scholars, local officials, and policymakers engage in cross-
national comparisons to assess different urban governance and 
planning models, a number of pertinent questions quickly rise to the 
surface.  How can some cities’ experiences guide and enrich our 
understanding of what cities in other parts of the world should or 
should not do?  What is the relevance of these comparisons in 
determining what type of economic development agenda is more 
suitable to a specific political and economic environment?  How can 
interdisciplinary tools be utilized to establish some entry points for 
cross-national comparisons?  What are the limitations of cross-
national comparisons given the ways in which most local governments 
around the world are constrained within a vertical system of legal 
hierarchy? 
Comparative legal scholars have long grappled with similar 
questions and have developed methodological frameworks and 
hypotheses to help us understand why some legal rules and 
institutions travel and others do not, and to determine when it is 
desirable for some legal regimes to converge and for others to remain 
divergent.  Even though economic globalization has shaped the ways 
in which cities are governed, local government legal scholars have 
only recently begun to contribute to the growing field of Comparative 
Urban Governance (CUG), which has largely been dominated by 
comparative political theorists, urban planners, and economists 
committed to best practices for urban growth and modernization.3  
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Nestor M. Davidson, What is Urban Law Today? An Introductory Essay 
in Honor of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Fordham Urban Law Journal, 40 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1579, 1592 (2013) (“What is driving the increasing salience of 
cities and their metropolitan regions in the United States, however, is less that 
demographic reality (which is mostly a function of the rapid growth of cities in the 
developing world) than the fact that gridlock in national and state policymaking is 
increasingly ceding to the pragmatism of local governance.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Alan DiGaetano & Elizabeth Strom, Comparative Urban 
Governance: An Integrated Approach, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 356 (2003) (reviewing the 
literature and major approaches to the study of comparative urban governance; three 
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Importantly, local government legal scholars have identified and 
analyzed the emergence of cities, including transnational networks of 
cities, as critical actors on the international legal stage, shaping global 
legal norms and the implementation of international laws around the 
world.4  However, comparative analysis by legal scholars (and 
practitioners) of similar legal rules and policies adopted by cities 
around the world, although not uncommon, most often fail to really 
engage methodological questions underlying such comparisons. 
This introductory essay begins to fill what we perceive as a 
prominent gap existing in the local government and comparative law 
literature.  The task to compare local government law is not only 
daunting because of the extreme variation among local governments, 
but also because there is the perception that such comparison is of 
lesser relevance when comparative legal scholars have traditionally 
focused on states, constitutions, or geographic regions.  Indeed, 
comparing the policies and practices of local governments may very 
well require its own mode of analysis.  In undertaking this project, we 
realize that the relevant methodological insights for lawyers and 
scholars approaching CUG derive from various legal disciplines.  In 
particular, there are at least three legal fields that offer insights, as 
well as illuminate shortcomings, for those who engage in CUG: local 
government law, comparative law, and the law of international 
economic development. 
This introductory essay explains the relationship between CUG 
and these distinct legal fields through the rich contributions that were 
developed for a joint session of the Sections on State and Local 
Government and Comparative Law on CUG, organized by the 
authors of this Introduction, for the 2014 Annual Meeting of the 
American Association of Law Schools.  Each Article offers an 
innovative and thoughtful approach that links different strands of 
local government law, comparative law, and international economic 
development scholarship, while offering a rich menu for urban 
reformers committed to rethinking sustainability and democratic 
inclusion as integral parts of economic development strategies for 
cities.  Combined with the Articles collected in this volume, our aim is 
to sketch out a methodological framework for lawyers and legal 
                                                                                                                 
approaches are structural, cultural, and rational actor approaches); see also JEFFEREY 
M. SELLERS, GOVERNING FROM BELOW: URBAN REGIONS AND THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (Margaret Levi ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). 
 4. See Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875 
(2006); Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 
URB. LAW. 1 (2006). 
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scholars seeking to understand or contribute to this growing field of 
expertise. 
The essay proceeds as follows: In Part I, we bring together a 
number of insights from scholars writing in three disparate but, for 
our purposes, intersecting fields, as we tease apart what might be 
unique about comparing the policies and practices of local 
governments, particularly city governments.  This Part sketches an 
outline of a methodological framework for CUG, drawing attention 
to the analytical tools we believe are essential for lawyers and legal 
scholars.  Parts II to IV review the Articles written for this symposium 
to illustrate how each of the authors employs the tools within our 
framework in their study of urban policies and practices that migrate 
across national borders.  Finally, we end the essay by musing on the 
important role that lawyers and legal scholars can play in the field of 
CUG. 
I.  COMPARING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD 
This symposium uses insights from strands of scholarship in 
comparative law, local government law, and law and development as 
a starting point to carve out a space for lawyers to engage in CUG.  
This entails mapping a methodology or a blueprint to compare the 
competing “legal formants”—the various actors and contexts—at 
work in different local government regimes, and analyzing the 
political, economic, and social stakes underlying each local regime. 
A. Comparative Law Praxis 
Legal scholars engaging in comparative analysis of legal rules and 
policies adopted by cities to address urban challenges tend to adopt 
one of two approaches.  They analyze the impact of globalization on 
local government regimes typically through either a convergenist or 
divergenist approach.5  Work of scholars like James Kushner, a 
contributor to this symposium and author of a major textbook on 
Comparative Urban Planning Law, is characterized by a prescriptive 
impulse in finding common policies, or best practices, which can be 
used to solve similar local problems.6  Other urban scholars, on the 
other hand, acknowledge the diversity and fragmentation of local 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Nadav Shoked, Comparative Local Government 
Law in Motion: How Different Local Government Law Regimes Affect Global 
Cities’ Bike Share Plans, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 123 (2014). 
 6. JAMES KUSHNER, COMPARATIVE URBAN PLANNING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE LENS OF 
COMPARING THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER NATIONS (2003) 
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government rules and practices under the pressure of economic 
globalization and/or historical and geographical path dependencies.7 
Comparative legal scholars have largely tread this analytical 
terrain, although the tension between convergence and divergence 
remains central to the discipline.  Nevertheless, over time 
comparative scholars have developed methods and ambitions that 
have led to important insights into these and other methodological 
questions. 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, comparative lawyers 
perceived their role as actors and promoters of social change with 
varying degrees of awareness of their actual involvement in 
governance and politics.  However, by the mid-century, functionalist 
comparative scholars began showing a discomfort with politics that 
altered the value of their seemingly neutral scientific approach.8  In 
other words, at this point comparative law scholarship had become 
largely insulated from the power struggles and the socio-economic 
tensions embedded in questions of lawmaking.  Some of the most 
resilient concepts in the field were developed around this time—such 
as Rene David’s idea of “legal families;”9 Konrad Zweigert and Hein 
Kötz’s functional assessments of doctrinal and institutional 
differences and similarities between legal regimes;10 and Alan 
Watson’s now widespread theory of “Legal Transplants.”11  All these 
were presented as products of scientific comparative law knowledge 
operating within a deductive doctrinal framework and having little to 
do with changes in societies, as if the legal profession was insulated 
from the real world. 
Since the 1990s, critical theory scholars have called upon 
comparative lawyers to regain confidence in the realm of politics, and 
to openly acknowledge the professional and academic commitments 
that underlie their efforts.12  As a result, some comparative lawyers 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See generally Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 
VA. L. REV. 1837 (2010). 
 8. David Kennedy, The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, in 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 345 (Pierre Legrand 
& Roderick Munday eds., 2003). 
 9. RENÉ DAVID, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (John E. C. Brierley trans., 
The Free Press 1978). 
 10. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1998). 
 11. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993). 
 12. See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative 
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985). 
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rejected or called impossible the notion of legal transplants,13 while 
others replaced this notion with better-articulated concepts of 
‘migration of ideas’14 or ‘legal diffusion.’15  In dismantling the fiction 
of legal families, for example, Jorge Esquirol effectively demonstrates 
how this notion produced and consolidated standard images in the 
law that bear no resemblance to reality but instead carry an 
ethnocentric bias.  For instance, the creation of Latin American law 
ended up using one country’s legal system to generalize about the 
whole of the region.16  Moreover, western-centrism embodied the 
assumption that certain institutions and procedures are preferable to 
the failed local ones that should be continuously reformed.17 
With the challenges posed by post-colonialism and legal 
globalization, comparative lawyers have put forward the need for a 
more politically responsible comparative law discipline by pushing 
back against problematic assumptions regarding the economic 
efficiency of the common law at the expense of the civil law.18  They 
seek a more structural approach to understanding how  legal 
institutions have a “dynamic, or dialectical, or constitutive” 
relationship to economic globalization.19 
Comparative law brings important insights to CUG, especially in its 
ability to map formal and informal regimes influencing city 
governance, as well as vertical and horizontal influences on city 
power.  Namely, comparative law methodology asks how local 
institutions are reproduced by other local governments or how the 
city becomes the recipient of an idea that migrates from a nation state 
or international legal regime.  Finally, CUG should resist the 
tendency to valorize per se Western institutions and to rely on 
“macro-generalizations” about legal regimes.20  Rather, it should 
show how a variety of cities are playing a central role in the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. 
EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 116–20 (1997). 
 14. See THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 2–3 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 
2011). 
 15. See generally William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 1 J. 
COMP. L. 237 (2006). 
 16. See Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 
75, 84–86 (2008). 
 17. See id. at 86–109. 
 18. See e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, The Syndrome of the 
Efficiency of the Common Law, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 287 (2011). 
 19. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 
(David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). 
 20. Garoupa & Leguerre, supra note 18, at 288. 
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globalization of local government law since legal change happens not 
because of a single social purpose, but through a multiplicity of local 
and global factors, both internal and external, to urban governance. 
B. Situating Cities in the Global Economic and Legal Order 
Although many view local government law as the quintessential 
domestic field of law, economic globalization, coupled with global 
migration, have turned cities into central players in the world 
economy.21  Sociologists like Saskia Sassen have pointed out how 
‘global cities’ such as London, Tokyo, and New York have emerged 
from the concentration of financial industries to affect the urban form 
of these cities, as well as its workers and larger populace in a way that 
reorganizes prior capital-labor relations.22  The burgeoning literature 
on ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities is important in the local governance 
literature not only for highlighting the internationalization of cities, 
but also for the critiques of the ways in which cities are developing 
and being embraced in the new global economic order.23 
If legal globalization has lagged behind its economic counterpart, 
lawyers have nevertheless become adept at tracing how economic 
globalization has impacted constitutional law regimes,24 legal 
thought,25 transnational legal regimes,26 and eventually trickled down 
to local government law.  Jerry Frug and David Barron, in particular, 
have demonstrated how cities interact with each other, through 
transnational networks of cities, and with international legal regimes, 
to become “independent international actors” while remaining 
formally subordinate to state governments.27  As global regimes lend 
autonomy to cities and facilitate their independence from the states 
that endow them with legal power, these cities are in turn able to 
shape international legal rules and norms.28 
“International local government law,”29 as developed by Frug and 
Barron, and others, furthers our understanding of what kind of cities 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See Friedmann, supra note 1. 
 22. See SASSEN, supra note 1. 
 23. See Rodriguez & Shoked, supra note 5 (explaining the non-prescriptive 
nature of the initial authors, such as Sassen and Friedmann, and the more normative 
position of later ones, especially agglomeration economists such as Glaeser). 
 24. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2005). 
 25. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 19. 
 26. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 898 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012). 
 27. See Frug & Barron, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. See id. at 2. 
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globalization is promoting while warning us against the perils of the 
“private city.”30  As cities become more independent in the new 
global legal order, obtaining voice and influence on the international 
stage, they have also become prime disseminators of global capital 
and the main promoters of private economic development.31  This 
development, although perhaps inevitable given the political and 
market forces at work, harkens back to a well-established tradition of 
‘privatism’32 in the United States.  That is, the privatization of cities, 
under the gist of international economic development and 
modernization, appears increasingly consequentialist in a way that 
foregrounds market actors rather than city governments,33 middle 
class rather than the poor, and shopping malls rather than public 
spaces.34 
While cities have become influential actors on the international 
policy and lawmaking stage, it is also true that international law and 
institutions increasingly shape the governance approach and local 
policies adopted by cities around the world.  As Illeana Porras has 
argued, the “new intimacy” between cities and international 
organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) is shaping the vision of the ideal city in ways 
that are increasingly divorced from “the people” to whom the city is 
supposed to be responsive and closer to the normative commitments 
of these institutions.35  As international institutions play a larger role 
in directly funding urban projects and attracting foreign investment to 
cities, it is no surprise that their respective development agendas 
become more closely aligned.36 
This literature suggests that CUG, in comparing the local practices 
and policies of cities around the world, be ever attentive to the ways 
that international laws and institutions shape those policies and 
practices.  As cities become more autonomous actors, it is important 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 4. 
 31. Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 
263 (2006). 
 32. See Frug & Barron, supra note 4, at 57 (tracing this notion back to SAM BASS 
WARNER, THE PRIVATE CITY: PHILADELPHIA IN THREE PERIODS OF GROWTH 
(1968)). 
 33. See id. at 58. 
 34. See, e.g., Priya S. Gupta, Constructing Modernity in Urban India: The Role of 
the Judiciary in Slum Clearance, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 25 (2014) (explaining the 
transformation of New Delhi). 
 35. Illeana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable 
Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 555 (2009). 
 36. See id. at 555–56. 
2014] COMPARATIVE URBAN GOVERNANCE 9 
that CUG engage in questions of democratic and political 
accountability to a variety of local, international, and transnational 
actors.  For instance, because cities have become the natural site for 
sustainable development policies, CUG should discern whom 
development policies are designed to serve and toward what ends.37  
One question that CUG might address is whether the influence of 
international and transnational organizations necessitates that 
development patterns replicate themselves in global cities. 
C. Legal Reform and International Development 
Understanding the important role that international legal 
institutions can assume in urban governance, both substantively and 
procedurally, requires some appreciation of the law and development 
literature.  The beginning of the law and development literature dates 
back to the 1960s, when U.S. legal academics participated in 
international development projects under the auspices of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Ford 
Foundation.38  These projects aimed to export U.S. legal education to 
Latin America in support of efforts there to ‘modernize’ Latin 
American legal education.39  The comparative lawyers and academics 
involved in these projects had little self-consciousness about the local 
perception of their missionary intervention.40  What marked the end 
of this period of ostensible legal reform was a groundbreaking essay 
by David Trubek and Marc Galanter explaining the self-estrangement 
scholars like themselves experienced while advancing the Western 
framework of ‘liberal legalism,’ which operated on assumptions that 
were at odds with Brazilian, Argentinian, or Chilean realities in which 
these scholars were asked to collaborate to bring about legal and 
institutional reforms.41 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 584 (“While political and fiscal decentralization, without question, free 
the city from a certain degree of subservience to the state, the new ‘autonomous’ city 
is expected to exercise its public capacity only to the point of ensuring a free market 
environment amenable to private investment and to ensure that residents who can 
afford them will be efficiently provided with good services.”). 
 38. See, e.g., José A Gómez-Ibáñez, Alternatives to Infrastructure Privatization 
Revisited: Public Enterprise Reform from the 1960s to the 1980s 8 (The World Bank: 
Sustainable Dev. Network, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4391, 2007). 
 39. See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs I: The 
Chile Law Program, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 481, 481 (2000). 
 40. Id. at 492–93. 
 41. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some 
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 
WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974). 
10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
The second wave of law and development literature in the 1990s 
was pervaded by neoliberal policies42 which sought to reform markets 
and private law, rather than the public law regimes promoted globally 
by the Washington Consensus in the first wave.43  However, the joint 
focus of economists and lawyers to tailor development strategies to 
neoliberal legal reforms began waning as a result of disappointment 
with market shock therapies in Russia and Latin America, and 
opposition to structural adjustment policies across East Asia with 
active state intervention.44  The critiques of the Washington 
Consensus began to take root in law and development strategies, 
pushing those strategies to include civil society as well as human and 
social goals in the post-neoliberal development agenda.45 
The space created by the demise of the Washington Consensus led 
to renewed attention to law in several forms, but, from our 
perspective, with an increasing attention to localism and local 
governmental institutions.  In particular, the ‘New Institutionalism’ of 
Douglass North aimed to foreground the role of government 
institutions in regulating formal and informal markets so that ‘good 
governance,’ meaning fiscal integrity and strong economies without 
corruption, would take hold.46  Reinforcing this vision centered on the 
relevance of property rights and Hernando de Soto’s work became 
predominant in spreading the notion that informality was the main 
obstacle to why entrepreneurs and land owners could not generate 
new surplus from their hidden assets in the informal economy.47  
Many of these goals have become part of the eight Millennium 
                                                                                                                 
 42. We use neoliberal here to refer to the set of political and economic policies 
designed to preserve free markets, private property rights, and free trade. See DAVID 
HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005). 
 43. See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in 
Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE 
NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 25, at 1, 6. 
 44. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Is There a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?, in 
THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 41–48 (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008). 
 45. See David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development 
Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, 
supra note 25, at 95. 
 46. See ROBERT H. BATES, THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM. THE WORK OF 
DOUGLAS NORTH, available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/rbates/publications/new-
institutionalism-work-douglas-north. 
 47. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY 
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2003). 
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Development Goals (MDGs), which attempt to reduce poverty while 
spurring economic development by 2015.48 
The innovation to move beyond the MDGs, driven by the 
economist Jeffrey Sachs, provided the foundational ideas as well as 
key indicators that the IMF, Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), and WB later adopted.49  While some 
have embraced this initiative, which offers indicators on how to 
measure development, others have questioned the conspicuous 
absence of the rule of law and human rights, and sensed that law has 
become simply a technocratic tool with which to quantify and spur 
economic efficiency.50  Some scholars have pushed back against the 
formal neutrality and scientific orientation undergirding the idea that 
law is neither shaped by, nor shapes, economic globalization.51  In the 
same vein, they have shown the failures of de Soto’s assumption that 
informality is per se a lawless regime, when informality is really a 
result of legal regimes.52  For example, the informal sector is nurtured 
where high cost land-titling causes de facto low-income housing, such 
as in shantytowns in Panama City.53 
CUG can contribute to these insights by showing how the 
neoliberal development agenda has created specific features for cities, 
like the rise of consumption and privatization of urban spaces, 
gentrification, and the attraction of foreign capital through rapid 
urbanization.54  Through the reduction of public spaces and the 
weakening of the democratic ties between the city and the people 
inhabiting it, the development agenda has replaced the inclusive and 
tolerant nature of cosmopolitan cities55 with market efficiency and 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See generally United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. 
Doc A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). 
 49. See Thomas Kelley, Beyond the Washington Consensus and New 
Institutionalism: What is the Future of Law and Development?, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 539, 547 (2010). 
 50. See id. at 550. 
 51. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: 
WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008). 
 52. See Jorge L. Esquirol, Titling and Untitled Housing in Panama City, 4 TENN. 
J.L. & POL’Y 243, 245–46 (2008); see also Sheila R. Foster, Urban Informality as a 
Commons Dilemma, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 261 (2009). 
 53. See Esquirol, supra note 52, at 249–50. 
 54. See Gupta, supra note 34, at 74–85 (explaining how the neoliberal 
development agenda has operated in New Dehli through specific urban policies as 
well as legal strategies such as the formalization of property rights). 
 55. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (2011). 
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gentrification values that displace the poor under the rhetoric of 
public safety, public health, and property rights.56 
II.  FROM FUNCTIONALISM TO LEGAL FORMANTS 
The first hurdle for comparative lawyers is to overcome the so-
called static method or ‘comparison by columns’ that is indifferent to 
the law in action.  The disregard of the law in practice and the 
implementation of legal norms make this type of comparison 
superficial, if not inaccurate, when the law in the books is the only 
one described in each column.  If the comparison by columns is still 
dominant among think tanks, and even the WB, the problem is that 
the columns portray legal systems as isolated legal islands rather than 
as systems influenced by a broader legal culture, society, and legal 
rationality.  Finally, comparison by columns is under-selective and 
limited to formal, rather than informal, rules resulting in an inability 
to consider much of the reality of how law operates in practice. 
What was revolutionary with the widespread use of the functional 
approach since the twentieth century was that lawyers engaged in 
comparative law research by addressing legal rules in practice, in their 
context, without limiting themselves to law in the books.57  This 
functionalist method relies on the notion that there are similar 
problems that can be compared, even though these might involve 
distinct doctrines of legal institutions in different legal systems, by 
tackling the same functional question.58 
A. Functionalism 101: Kushner’s Institutional Corruption 
James Kushner’s essay, published in the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal’s online companion to this issue, City Square, and his 
pioneering work on CUG, have marked important efforts in tearing 
down both the impression that it is impossible to compare this field of 
law and the tendency to pursue comparisons merely by columns by 
showing that similar local problems deserve a full-fledged functional 
comparison.59  Kushner’s contribution to this conference sheds light 
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on how, in U.S. municipal governments, land-use planning and 
regulation often appear structured to allow the maximum amount of 
corruption possible.  Developers and contractors are expected to 
make political contributions to local politicians who possess the 
power to block or facilitate development and public contracts.  For 
example, in Los Angeles there is an understanding among city council 
members that they will defer to the council representative from the 
district where the development is proposed on zoning matters, such as 
variances, subdivisions, and zoning amendments.60  This allows 
legislators to have free reign over the projects and facilitates 
exactions as a price of development.61 
In his comparison, the examples coming from the European land-
use planning context appear to be welcoming attempts to ameliorate 
these problems significantly.  For example, in Stockholm, despite a 
large legislative body of elected members that makes the decision-
making process lengthy and complex, the system actually creates 
more transparency.62  As another example, Germany requires the 
government of the State or the German Land to be consulted and to 
approve of significant local projects and plans.63  Finally, the 
Netherlands requires shared decision-making between local and state 
government in development projects, subject to the national 
standards.64  Despite the seemingly built-in safeguards against the 
kind of influence and corruption that private developers exercise over 
local land use decisions in the United States, Kushner nevertheless is 
able to discern that these European systems are still prone to 
corporate capture in an environment of global competition for 
investment capital and shrinking municipal budgets.65 
In Kushner’s examples, it is not clear if each of the lauded 
European solutions really advance his social-purpose goal of anti-
corruption, even if they advance other policy goals.  For example, the 
city of Stockholm was trying to achieve social inclusion, gentrification, 
or decentralization of power rather than combat corruption when it 
adopted its policy.  The social-purpose functionalist approach used by 
Kushner certainly narrows the comparison to a particular goal aiming 
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to find ‘best solutions’ to important problems.  However, critiques to 
this comparative approach have shown that such a narrow framework 
often collapses the distinction between facts versus ends, and neglects 
the potential that best institutional solutions might not solve social 
problems in different social contexts.66 
B. Legal Formants at Work: Global Cities’ Bike Share Plans 
As explained earlier, Rodolfo Sacco’s legacy in comparative law 
has been the structural analysis of legal systems through the lens of 
“legal formants.”67  These are not selections of a single social purpose 
or functions in the law; instead they capture legal outcomes as a 
product of conflicting forces that must be contextualized before they 
can be explained.  Thus, to understand legal norms, comparative 
lawyers must understand the particular configuration, competition, 
and compromises among the formants that produce them.68  The 
structuralist element in Sacco’s legal formants approach highlights the 
recurrent opening of a gap between declaratory statements and 
operative rules—a gap that recurs throughout various legal sources of 
each legal system.69  Daniel Rodriguez and Nadav Shoked’s insightful 
Article in this volume, Comparative Local Government Law in 
Motion: How Different Local Government Law Regimes Affect 
Global Cities’ Bike Share Plans, develops a structural comparative 
approach that bears resemblance to Sacco’s ‘legal formants’ 
approach.70 
Sacco’s legal formants approach offers a dynamic understanding of 
comparative law.  In refusing the principle of ‘the unity of the law,’ 
Sacco insists that each legal rule becomes the product of the 
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interaction, competition, and struggle among the different legal 
formants (legislation, case-law, scholarly work, ideology such as in the 
Soviet legal system, etc.).71  Moreover, there is a second level of 
deconstruction of legal rules that is relevant to each legal formant—
namely the disjuncture between the declaratory statement and its 
operative rule.72  This structural method allowed Sacco to show the 
limits of the deductive method and, more generally, to internally 
criticize the dogmatism pervading post-WWII Italian legal academia 
depicting its legal system as gapless and coherent.73 
The starting point of legal formants is to show how the law works 
in practice with very different outcomes.  For example, even though 
the French and Belgian civil codes might have the same legal 
provisions, outcomes in these legal systems might be strikingly 
different.  Likewise, although Italy and France have different 
declaratory statements in their civil codes, their courts may 
nonetheless apply the same operative rule.74  Thus, the operative rule, 
or the ‘law in action,’ determines the decision and is imperative to 
understand. Rather than a fixed law on the books, the operative rule 
determines the real content of the norm.  But it is dynamic rather 
than static, and it can change over time.  In contrast to operative 
rules, declaratory statements, which are purported explanations of 
operative rules, can be true or false. 
Rodriguez and Shoked’s project is ambitious and original not only 
because of its rigorous structure, but also for mapping what is a truly 
global diffusion of bike share plans in Paris, London, Barcelona, 
Chicago, New York, Boston, Washington, D.C., Mexico City, Buenos 
Aires, Taipei, Vancouver, Montreal, Melbourne, and Tel Aviv.  Each 
local government jurisdiction is not a unitary ‘black box,’ but is 
instead dissected by the authors through an elegant typology of four 
different axes mapping the source of cities’ administrative and 
jurisdictional authority internally, vertically vis-à-vis the states and 
other smaller levels of authority, and horizontally with other local and 
regional bodies.75 
The point of this exercise is not just a deconstruction of local 
governments’ authority, but rather a powerful insight on the diffusion 
and the successful implementation of urban policies ‘in motion.’  
Through the analytics of the four axes of authority, it becomes clear 
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that the most contested policies surrounding the implementation of 
bike sharing plans, such as the process of the plans’ adoption, the 
funding scheme, and the location of bike docking stations, will 
determine whether these plans will be successful in a particular 
place.76  The structural correlation between the institutional and 
jurisdictional organization of local government powers explains the 
triumph or failure of bike sharing plans in a city.  For instance, the 
authors show that after the initial decision to implement a bike share 
plan, there are corollary policies, such as the existence of state road 
safety helmet requirements, which can cause the failure of the plan’s 
implementation if the city does not obtain permission from the state 
to modify these provisions.77 
The authors conclude with the ambition that their model will 
become a blueprint for comparative local government law that will 
enable urban planners, politicians, and lawyers to anticipate the 
likelihood of success of the complex set of operative rules 
underpinning any urban policy.  Yet they also acknowledge the 
limitation of their comparative local government method.  Namely, 
even their account does not fully capture the variation in legal and 
political culture, not to mention history, that influence local actors’ 
ability to adopt and design policies.  This limitation explains the 
shortcomings of even a well-executed structural comparative analysis 
of legal rules and institutional design without paying enough attention 
to the path dependencies, histories, and cultures shaping each city.78 
III.  CONTEXTUALISM AND EXPRESSIVISM IN COMPARATIVE 
URBAN GOVERNANCE 
In comparative constitutional law, Mark Tushnet has powerfully 
illustrated some of the main methods adopted by lawyers in this 
discipline.  While ‘normative universalism’ seeks to unearth the 
founding normative principles of a constitutional order, 
‘functionalism’ compares instead to the institutional design laid out by 
the constitution.  Tushnet refers to a set of more critical methods: 
while ‘contextualism’79 is geared towards demonstrating how law is 
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embedded in a particular society and history, ‘expressivism’80 reflects 
the way nations use constitutional rules to define themselves.  An 
expressivist analysis captures, for instance, the ‘inward-looking’ 
United States and ‘outward-looking’ Canada vis-à-vis the deeply 
contested question of capital punishment.81  In combining some of the 
different constitutional methods from different nations, comparative 
lawyers become bricoleurs.82  They also discover and debunk ‘false 
necessities’—salient institutional, doctrinal, and ideological features 
that emerge as seemingly necessary but that in fact may preclude legal 
change in a particular context.83 
Both critical methods—contextualism and expressivism—emerge 
in Priya Gupta’s Article in this issue.84  Gupta situates the ongoing 
jurisprudence of the Indian courts vis-à-vis property rights, the 
relocation of slums, and the definition of city space in a broader 
historical and socio-economic context shaped by, and in turn 
contributing to, a global development agenda being promoted 
simultaneously in Washington and New Delhi.85  New Delhi is a 
global city where, despite the fact that globalization has created 
economic opportunities for many, there is new fragmentation, local 
resistance, and, as Sakia Sassen explains, ‘deurbanizing’ processes 
through expulsion of the poor, surveillance, and privatization.86  
However, Gupta sheds new light on the interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence.  Her contextual and historical analysis of the 
Indian city shows that the road not taken in New Delhi is an 
economic development strategy that includes the urban poor.  The 
false necessity created by economic development and modernization 
ideologies has prevented Indian courts from embracing less rigid and 
formalistic conceptions of property to accommodate, as Gupta 
explains it, “different lifestyles.”87 
Gupta’s Article contends that marginalization of populations living 
in urban slums is being accomplished legally through shifts in how 
urban space, and its associated rights, have been conceptualized by 
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the Indian courts.88  She traces the trajectory of this jurisprudence 
back to a prominent 1985 case in the Indian Supreme Court, which 
was a thin victory for the slum residents, based on the right to life 
rather than a social interpretation of public property.89  This 
jurisprudential turn is striking, she argues, if one accounts for the 
historical context, specifically the Indian constitutional moment of the 
1950s through the 1970s, in which early jurisprudential interpretation 
of property rights promoted India’s legislature to pass laws to 
redistribute land.90  Much to the dissatisfaction of the Indian people, 
however, the land reforms failed to produce the economic growth the 
state strived for.91  Consequently, with state-centric policies being 
discredited in India, more modern policies gave rise to neoliberalism 
in the 1980s.92  The reforms advocated by the government under the 
leadership of the Washington Consensus included deregulation, 
privatization of state-owned industries, and opening India to more 
international trade and capital.93  It is through this more recent 
history and context that Indian courts deny access to shelter to 
indigent people and people living in slums. 
Although Gupta’s Article does not explicitly undertake a 
comparison with other countries of Indian jurisprudence regarding 
property rights and economic development, it illustrates the kind of 
contextualism that is a precursor to rigorous comparisons of similar 
(or the same) legal doctrines between different legal regimes.94  
Likewise, her analysis embodies the expressivist analysis of 
comparative constitutional methodology, which captures the ways in 
which places define themselves.  As Gupta powerfully argues, court 
decisions since 2000 which involve New Delhi have strengthened a 
version of the ‘modern’ city that goes hand-in-hand with a neoliberal 
development agenda in which workers in the waste management 
sectors implicitly belong to lower caste communities, which makes it 
increasingly more difficult for the most marginalized people to inhabit 
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city space anywhere.95  In subsequent cases, the jurisprudence 
continues to blame city problems on migrants and the marginalized 
people in society and abolishes any settled expectation, or right, to 
housing.96  When framing the actors of these cases, Gupta is explicit 
about the expressive elements of the jurisprudence in the way that 
courts label the residents of the slums as ‘trespassers’ and blame the 
victims for their own lot in life.97  This expressivism is ironically 
decontextualized due to courts’ unwillingness to examine the 
historical, geographical and political economy characterizing the 
circumstances in which informal housing emerged in the country. 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN ACTION 
Embedded in the lessons of International Local Government Law, 
Andrea McArdle’s Article argues that municipalities now play a 
prominent role in preparing for weather disasters and climate 
change.98  Given the relationship that local governments have to land 
use, infrastructure, public health, and safety obligations in cities, they 
are the first line of defense in preparing for weather disasters.99  
While municipal governments are at times vertically limited in terms 
of their ability to shape policies or initiate legislation, McArdle’s 
Article illustrates the ways that cities have acquired the power to 
engage with international soft law regimes such as transitional 
governance networks.  These regimes have proliferated as 
‘information-driven’ ones100—endeavoring to share information, seek 
collaboration for problem-solving, and develop best practices for local 
governance.101  They are an important illustration of the move from 
local ‘government’ to ‘governance,’ partly the result of cities’ new and 
increasingly autonomous role on the international stage and 
encouraged by international policymaking institutions.102 
McArdle’s Article adds to the International Local Government 
blueprint the notion that soft law, as developed by vertical-public as 
well as private-public collaboration, opens up new avenues for 
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innovation and legal design by cities.  The notion of soft law reflects 
two major trends in the globalization of law: the striking 
multiplication of producers of law and, in turn, of bodies of law, and 
also the increasing privatization of legal regimes.103  Her Article 
highlights the need for a more soft and horizontal approach of ‘city-
to-city engagement’ in order to tackle climate change.104  This 
approach will enable cities to take a more active role in the 
prevention of weather disasters, and in shaping climate change policy 
generally.  Cities can become more active by developing networks to 
adapt to changing circumstances and to allow for public and private 
partnerships.105  Ultimately, these regulations emanate through the 
use of soft law—goal and target-setting, data aggregation related to 
outcomes, and information sharing.106 
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40 C Group) is an 
example of how cities have become generators of policies and 
practices that “can spread and gain adherents among other cities.”107  
The C40 C Group operates by congregating a network of the world’s 
largest cities seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emission and take 
other actions to decrease climate-related risks.108  These transnational 
networks position urban governments horizontally, rather than just 
vertically, and very much operate autonomously within an 
international framework.109  C40, for instance, works in conjunction 
with partners such as the WB, World Resource Institute, and 
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) to 
finance and support such initiatives.110  By engaging with these 
partnerships, McArdle argues that cities are better able to participate 
in the global response to climate change.  Cities that face the most 
direct threats from extreme weather events also carry the advantage 
of being highly knowledgeable about local conditions, resources, and 
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vulnerabilities that must be considered in developing appropriate 
responses.111 
In a genealogical study of soft law, Anna di Robilant has shown 
that its genealogy can be traced either to medieval legal pluralist lex 
mercatoria or later on in the social tradition developed by nineteenth-
century jurists echoing notions of flexibility and organicism.112  These 
genealogical strands, however, tend to obscure the distributive 
consequences and the power dynamics that lie behind soft law and 
governance networks promoted globally.  By responding to this 
critique, McArdle puts forward the limitations of her soft law 
approach in explaining that “well-resourced non-state participants 
will dwarf the role of local government actors and, perhaps, reinforce 
dynamics of dependency among cities in less developed regions.”113  
As to the underlying power dynamic, McArdle acknowledges that 
these networks lack legal accountability and might be driven by 
economic growth rather than a sustainability rationale.114 
To tame the ‘growth imperative’115 spread by economic 
globalization, McArdle’s hope lies in a robust involvement of cities 
through democratic deliberation in transnational horizontal networks 
pressured by civil society mobilization and commitment to urban 
sustainability and resilience.116  We believe that such hope could be 
furthered by empirical work showing how civil society is empowered 
to put pressure on, rather than be coopted by, transnational networks 
including other cities as well as private and international actors.117  
Despite the important challenges that McArdle’s Article engages 
with, her preliminary intervention is to show that horizontal networks 
enhance the ability of cities to take independent action, to influence 
policy, and to access valuable information on how cities around the 
world are responding to climate change. 
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CONCLUSION 
Among the central lessons of this symposium is the striking 
influence of economic globalization and international development 
trends on urban spaces and local legal regimes.  The changes 
triggered by these phenomena have opened new possibilities for 
urban governance—from the legal diffusion of urban policies as 
global cities begin to replicate each other to knowledge and 
information sharing via transnational urban government networks.  
However, the Articles in this issue also warn that public space is 
shrinking as local government regulation is replaced by contractual 
arrangements, and that there is a real deficit in public accountability 
and participation.118 
Take, for instance, what has become one of the most provocative 
ideas of the past few years: Paul Romer’s notion of a ‘charter city’—
an independent city in a country aiming to reduce poverty around the 
world.119  Charter cities would attract foreign investment and, like a 
‘technological oasis,’ become a big attraction for capital flows.120  The 
inspiration for charter cities, Romer claims, comes from the Hong 
Kong and Macao transfer of sovereignty via long-term leases.  In 
2011, Romer’s idea was put in action by President Porfirio Lobo Sosa 
of Honduras to form an independent or ‘model city’ with a very high 
degree of autonomy that would foment development in the region.121  
The President’s decree to amend the constitution to adopt model 
cities was ratified by the Honduran Parliament.122  In the aftermath of 
his parliamentary victory, Lobo signed a memorandum of 
understanding with a private development firm, the MKG Group, a 
consortium of investors led by Michael Strong investing an initial 
fifteen million dollars toward infrastructure, to develop and run the 
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areas.123  However the MKG Group’s vision of the model city was 
different from the diverse city of ten million people that Romer had 
in mind, as the Group envisioned the building of few factories that 
employed a few hundred thousand people that would attract investors 
due to low taxes and low wages.124 
Even though the Honduras model city decree was not a formal 
cession of territory, the responsibility for the legal regime was 
contracted out to a corporate entity that would administer civil and 
criminal matters through an independent commission, using as a court 
of appeal the Supreme Court of Mauritius.125  This would be a 
nightmare for contemporary comparative constitutional lawyers to 
imagine, considering that the Supreme Court of Mauritius has 
absolutely no contextual or expressive understanding of what 
happens in the model city in Honduras and yet must interpret the law 
and the constitutional rights of people that are not living in its 
territory.  Not surprisingly, in 2012 the Honduran Supreme Court 
declared the decree unconstitutional because the grant of legal 
authority to the Special Development Regions—in exchange of the 
future possibility of economic development—was in violation of the 
“territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Honduran 
State.”126  In 2013, the Honduran legislature again overwhelmingly 
passed another bill that would allow autonomously governed cities on 
its territory.127  At this point, Paul Romer distanced himself from the 
project and its role in a governmental commission, which, after a 
number of years, would transfer its full authority to the city’s 
residents.128 
Beyond the fact that Romer’s idea was transplanted in Honduras 
by an alleged corrupt administration, this action was witness to the 
creation of what Frug and Barron call the ‘private city’—one in which 
the authority over residents, rather than citizens, was exercised by 
independent commissions, a corporate board and a foreign supreme 
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court.129  The story embodies the prediction of the “Jewish 
question”130 about the changing nature of the participants to our civil 
society.  These have become abstract citizens instead of real human 
beings who are politically committed to participate and shape a 
democracy.  In charter cities, the abstract citizen who is a mere 
resident rather than a participant in government and governance of 
her space has no political rights because the territory no longer 
includes a public sphere. 
In our symposium, the important role of lawyers in CUG has 
emerged in different ways.  Gupta’s work shows how lawyers are able 
to reject false necessities in the framing of formal property rights that 
reserve the construction of urban spaces for middle and upper classes 
while excluding the poor.  The lesson of the Honduras charter city 
teaches us that comparative urban governance requires not only 
economists and urban planners, but most importantly lawyers who 
can develop original blueprints to compare local government laws in 
the case of Rodriguez and Shoked’s contribution, and, as McArdle 
demonstrates, share knowledge through transnational horizontal 
networks that build cities’ capacity to grow sustainably and 
democratically. 
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